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in which competition consists of candidates affecting turnout and the electorate's perception of each candidate's positions, and in which the social choice is a policy package which the victorious candidate advocates. This approach, inaugurated by Downs's An Economic Theory of Democracy, and falling under the general rubric "spatial models of party competition," has been scrutinized, criticized, and reformulated.2 To clarify the accomplishments of this formulation we identify and discuss in section 2 the general democratic problem of ascertaining a social preference. We review critically in section 3 the definitions and assumptions of our model. We consider in sections 4 and 5 the logic of a competitive electoral equilibrium. We assume in section 4 that the electorate's preferences can be summarized and represented by a single function; the analysis in section 5 pertains to competition between two organizational structures or two opposed ideologies (i.e., when two functions are required to summarize and represent the electorate's preference). Finally, we suggest in section 6 a conceptualization of electoral processes which facilitates extending and empirically testing our model.
II. THE DEMOCRATIC PROBLEM OF SOCIAL CHOICE
The early literature of spatial theory examines a relatively simple problem, a fundamental assumption of which is that a single dimension describes sufficiently the preferences of citizens. Assuming: (1) that candidates seek to win elections, (2) that all participants in elections (i.e., candidates and citizens) have perfect information, and (3) that the candidate can adopt any position on this single dimension; this literature seeks to ascertain the positions candidates should adopt. Finding such a position, however, requires, first, that it existsi.e., that some position be dominant, by which Since dominant positions exert a powerful attraction to candidates, the argument that candidates should converge to the median might appear to be trivial. However, such an argument is incomplete; it requires additional assumptions, one of the most important being that the form of each citizen's preferences is "single peaked". Specifically, the argument that all citizens to the right of 9* prefer 01 with 02 <01 = 0*, implicitly assumes the existence of a specific class of orderings of the alternatives on the horizontal axis. If preference is indicated on the vertical axis, the preference orderings in this class are represented by functions which change direction at most once from increasing to decreasing (i.e., are single peaked). If this assumption is not satisfied we may be unable to identify a dominant position so that a paradox of voting is said to exist.
The illustration of this assertion, which is a special case of Arrow's General Impossibility Theorem, is so simple that it bears repeating.3 the social preference ordering-A->C->B->A -is intransitive. Thus, if A, B, and C are the alternative positions for a candidate, he cannot find a strategy which guarantees him at least a tie.
The possibility that such a paradox exists poses a problem for majority decision-making. Although most standard procedures for aggregating individual preferences (e.g., voting) yield a unique social choice, if preferences are not single peaked such choices depend, for example, on the order in which the alternatives are presented.4 Thus, if we cannot guarantee the existence of dominant positions in the context of electoral campaigns, the outcome of an election may depend on the temporal order in which candidates select their strategies.
Downs, who was perhaps the first to introduce into the contemporary political literature the problems which the paradox poses, considers only the world of one dimension. A simple example demonstrates, however, that the problems which the paradox introduces are compounded as more dimensions are considered5. Consider Although this result may not be inordinately surprising, it demonstrates an important distinction between the unidimensional and multidimensional cases. Consider Figure 2 again but assume that citizens cannot vote on x1 (i.e., the value of xi is fixed). This is equivalent to assuming that only motions on a line parallel to the x2 axis may be considered. Preferences on this line, by construction, are single peaked so that the value of x2 preferred by V2 is the dominant choice. Alternatively, if x2 is fixed, the value of x2 preferred by v3 is the social choice. Thus, even though a dominant position exists for each of the dimensions taken individually, the composite of these dimensions yields an intransitive social preference.
We can easily imagine such a situation whenever citizens are permitted to vote both on the amount of some service to be provided publically and on the fiscal institutions for funding such a service. If the electorate is provided with the opportunity to vote only for the amount of the service to be provided (with a given fiscal institution) or only for the fiscal institution (with predetermined level of public activity) an unambiguous social choice may be revealed.6 Such choices, as the previous illustration demonstrates, are not guaranteed with the composite of these two issues.
Since such a simple example demonstrates that dominant positions, in general, do not exist for a multi-dimensional world, one wonders whether they might exist for some reasonable set of conditions. Tullock, for example, suggests that the paradox occurs with less frequency than we might otherwise anticipate from Arrow's analysis.' Socialization and agreement on basic normative precepts diminish the probablities of multi-peaked preferences, and certain symmetries of preference reduce the probability of a paradox occuring in a multidimensional world. Similarly, the molasseslike variability of political parameters, and the uncertainty and imperfect measuring devices of both practitioners and academics, bring into question the relevance of such precise mathematical analyses as those of Arrow and Black. Stated differently, we do not know the frequency with which the paradox occurs in reality. That the paradox can occur, nevertheless, raises an ominous note for democratic theory. Specifically, it decreases the probable parsimony of acceptable models. If social choices depend on the order in which motions are brought forward for a vote, or on the number of motions, or on the number of citizens voting, then those ceteris paribus conditions commonly scattered through academic tracts (such as this one) can be of considerable importance. We contend, therefore, that political lore, empirical generalizations, or simple graphic arguments are not satisfactory for understanding the political process. The primitive inquires of Hotelling and Smithies, and the verbal unidimensional elaborations of 1970 A MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 429 Downs, are inadequate. We also reject the argument that no generalization is possible, since such an assertion precludes all scientific inquiry. An adequate comprehension of political processes requires rigorous theory which specifies unambigously the relationships between relevant parameters. We seek, therefore, a model which promises to satisfy eventually our notions of an adequate thory (or which at least is conformable to such a theory). Given this objective, we now consider more rigorously the definitions and assumptions which constitute the foundation of our model.
III. DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
A theory which seeks to explain how parties and candidates do act or ought to act is predicated on the citizens' responses to the candidates' strategies. And our preoccupation with the paradox of voting in section 2 suggests that such a theory is central to a spatial analysis of the electoral process. If we assume that parties and candidates waltz annually before a blind audience-that the electorate is neither attentive nor responsive to the candidates' maneuvers-then spatial analysis is not a requisite for understanding this waltz.
We conceptualize each citizen's choices and actions as the outcome of a two-stage sequential decision process. First, we assume that the citizen evaluates both candidates' (or parties') positions in terms of his own preferences; second, that he decides whether to vote or to abstain. If he votes he supports his preferred candidate. The sequential decision process is ordered in this fashion because the model postulates that the decision concerning whether to vote or to abstain depends upon the citizen's comparative evaluation of the candidates.
Every formalization, however, reveals the ambiguities associated with one's initial conceptualization of a problem. Consider, first, the central problem of ascertaining the method citizens use to compare candidates. Downs, as we note earlier, assumes that citizens compare the candidates' ideological closeness to themselves. This requirement first motivated our analysis. Instead of assuming that each citizen prefers one position on a common dimension, we assume that a citizen prefers a position on each of many dimensions. We represent a preferred position by a number, x, on the scale identified with each dimension. Consequently, for the ith citizen and the kth dimension the symbol x?,* indicates the position that a citizen, i, most prefers with respect to the dimension, k. We represent the ith citizen's preferred positions for all n dimensions by the vector,
Fxil
(1) Because a multi-dimensional model permits this latitude in the specification of the electorate's criteria for evaluating candidates, Downs' assumption of rational action is rendered less objectionable. Rationality in Downs' analysis ostensibly requires that each citizen has some information about the candidates' positions on issues. This information, however, is not free, and because many regard their votes as inconsequential, they avoid this cost by voting on the basis of the candidates' images or on the basis of socially determined partisan preferences.'0 And since we interpret rational choice simply as choice which conforms to the assumptions of our model, voters are rational even though the candidates' positions on issues are disregarded."
Our analysis, moreover, is not sensitive to the number of relevant dimensions, or to their labels. The number and nature of issues change from election to election and it is doubtful whether anyone can successfully predict the issues that will be important in some future contest. These are parameters which must be ascertained empirically for each election.
The mathematical exercise of evaluating campaign strategies permits some ambiguity in the empirical referents for each dimension. The specification of the mathematical properties of the xi's, though, requires precision before rigorous analysis can proceed, and it is here that we constrain the realism of our model. First, we assume that each dimension of taste is continuous. This requires consideration of Stokes' observation that many dimensions are discrete and some are dichotomous (which Stokes terms "valence issues" Even with these assumptions we must find a more convenient summary for our information about the electorate's preference before analyzing spatial strategies. Such a summary is obtained by observing that the vestors represented by expression (1) are not simply a collection of numbers; they also define a multidimensional coordinate system. Thus, the vector xi, which represents the ith citizen's preferred position, identifies that citizen with some point in an n-dimensional coordinate system, where the citizen's preference on the kth dimension is measured along the kth axis of the coordinate system.
Assuming now that the preferred positions of all citizens are ascertained, we estimate the probability that a citizen, selected randomly from the electorate, prefers a particular position, say x0, by counting citizens preferring xO and dividing this number by the total number of citizens. When this calculation is performed for all preferences we plot a multivariate density of preferences, f(x), which characterizes the population in the sense that it represents a summary statement of the preferred positions of all citizens. We present in Figure 3 a unidimensional example in which a citizen, selected at random from the electorate, prefers xN with the probability f(x.). 14 Figure 4 graphs a two-dimensional example in which a citizen, selected at random from the electorate, prefers x., on the first demension and X02 on the second dimension with the probability f(x.1, X02).
The positions which a citizen prefers, however, are only a partial identification of the variables relevant for describing his calculus of voting. The act of voting implies a choice among candidates, so we require a representation of such alternatives. Additionally, since we assume that these choices involve a comparison of the alternatives and the citizen's preferred positions, we require that the representation of these alternatives conforms to expression (1 A candidate, of course, prefers to have all citizens believe that he supports each and every preference (i.e., Gj=xi for all i)and if attainment of this ideal is impossible he should adopt the second best solution of approximating this ideal as closely as possible. Our assumptions, nevertheless, exclude this possibility, so the positions associated with a candidate cannot (except in a trivial instance) satisfy all citizens. Thus, to explain the choices citizens make when regression coefficient may indicate only that the attitude has been made consistent with a predetermined preference because it is unimportant. Multiple regression analysis with many attitudinal variables, moreover, is not a satisfactory solution either. A statistically insignificant regression coefficient may indicate only that that variable is related to some other independent variable in the analysis although it may in fact be an important determinant of candidate preference. Because of such difficulties Gerald Kramer analyzes the relationship between policy preference and voting with variables which are more objectively measurable than attitudes in "An Empirical Analysis of Some Aggregative Hypotheses About U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964," (unpublished, Yale University, 1968). they regard neither candidate as perfectly satisfactory, we propose a measure of the citizen's evaluation of each candidate's position. Specifically, -we provide for the loss in utility any citizen sustains when his preferred position is not supported by the candidates. We accomplish this end by introducing the concept of individual loss functions-functions which must satisfy several intuitively desirable properties before they are employed in the model. First, if xi= 6j the loss citizen i sustains from candidate j's position, symbolically written Li(6j), should be at some minimum value or zero, since the candidate's position and the citizen's preference are identical for all dimensions.16 Consonant with this requirement, if xi#Oj (i.e., if at least one element of the vector xi is not equal to the corresponding element in Qj) the citizen should sustain a positive loss.
Hence, we assume, ceteris paribus, that the greater the discrepancy between any element of xi and the corresponding element in 0j the greater is the loss citizen i associates with candidate j.
The mathematical formulation of these requirements is rendered difficult because: (1) the set of mathematical functions satisfying these two criteria is infinite, and; (2) the available empirical evidence fails to restrict this set sufficiently. The solution we propose for this problem is to conduct the analysis when only the general form of the loss function is assumed.
Consider the following expression as a potential specification for a citizen's loss function when the number of issues, n, equals 1. This example reveals an important property of the a's-their relative magnitudes are dependent on the scales of measurement which are applied to each dimension. And since we do not know either the scales which might measure all conceivable dimensions, the relative importance citizens attach to each dimension, or the prior identification of salient issues, the proof of our theorems should not require knowing the values of the weights.18 Thus, we at-18 There exists, moreover, a linear transformation on the axes so that any quadratic of the form (x-O)'A(x-0) can be reduced to (x-6)'(x-0) without loss of generality (i.e., A becomes the identity matrix I). Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume that Li (0j) = E (Xik -jk) karl tempt to avoid the criticism that it is difficult, if not impossible, to estimate these weights in any real campaign by proving theorems which are insensitive to the magnitudes of the a's.
We note, however, that in our development of a citizen's loss function, the weights are not subscripted by i; the weights are assumed to be common to all voters. This assumption, which is used in the earliest developments of our basic model, implies that the electorate is homogeneous. In other words, no restrictions are placed upon the preferred positions, so that citizens can desire widely different policies, but the assumption implies that all citizens assign the same relative weight to any dimension. Consider the issue of school desegregation. The model allows some citizens to desire segregated schools and other citizens integrated ones. The assumption that the weights are common to all citizens, however, implies that everyone assigns the same degree of importance to the issue. The model does not allow some citizens to be concerned while others do not care whether or not schools are integrated.'9
Clearly, different citizens may not assign the same degree of importance to any issue. Yet the decision to allow individual loss functions to vary is not easily transferrable into a tractable model. Perhaps a natural method would be to assign different a's to citizens, but such a step results in a model whose complexity appears to prohibit the realization of meaningful analytical results. Accordingly, we utilize a simpler approach.
We assume that there exists some average level of concern for each issue and, if individual variations are permitted, these variations are represented as deviations from this average. We assume, additionally, that the patterns of individual variations in level of concern do not correlate with preference.20 This assumption appears to conflict with the proposition that a citizen is more likely to react intensely about an issue if he prefers an extreme rather than a moderate position. If the proposiso that the indifference contours for a citizen's loss function are concentric circles.
19 The assumption of a common A matrix does not imply an interpersonal comparison of utility. It implies that, when the loss functions for citizens are ascertained independently, there exists a monotonic transformation on each loss function such that all loss functions have a common A matrix in one coordinate system. 20 When nonvoting (which is discussed later) is caused by alienation, we must assume that variations in level of concern are independent of preference-a somewhat stronger assumption.
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tion is correct, however, one should anticipate that relatively large and positive deviations from average concern will be associated with citizens who prefer either extreme on an issue; so there may be a zero correlation, although intensity and preference are not really independent.
If we accept expression (6) as an adequate representation of a citizen's loss function, however, we also accept the assumption of marginally increasing loss (i.e., as the citizen's preference on any dimension and a candidate's position on that dimension become more disparate, the loss which the citizen associates with this candidate increases at an increasing rate). Marginally increasing loss, however, is a hypothesis which may be disconfirmed empirically and which can be an unnecessary assumption. A more general formulation of the loss function is one which permits marginally decreasing, as well as marginally increasing, loss.21 Such a formulation permits loss functions similar to the one illustrated in Figure 7 Thus, we come full circle to our discussion in the previous section of single peakedness and majority decision-making. Consider the following example: assume that citizens are asked to reveal their preferences for alternative tax rates. Some citizens may base their preference on the theory that "the lower the taxes the better." Others may believe that a certain amount of government activity is necessary, differing among themselves only on the amount. They prefer some intermediate tax rate. A third set of voters, however, seeks to insure the adequate financing of current programs and, consequently, favors a substantial increase in the tax rate-as opposed to an incremental increaseso that additional programs can be financed optimally. A prospective loss function for this type of citizen which fails to satisfy our assumptions is depicted in Figure 8 .
From the mathematical perspective of our assumptions the occurrence of such functions offers no problem. We can satisfy our assumption about the form of the loss function if we increase the dimensionality of the analysisby decomposing one dimension into two or more (e.g., reversing the process of factor analysis). But if loss functions on tax policy, for example, are similar to the function illustrated in Figure 8, P is the citizen's subjectively estimated probability that his vote materially affects the outcome, B is the absolute value of the subjective differential loss (or utility) between the candidates, D is the utility a citizen derives from participating in the electoral process-termed the citizen's sense of duty, C is the subjectively estimated cost of voting, R is the expected utility of voting less the expected utility of not voting.
Thus, the citizen votes if and only if R >0, and he abstains from voting if and only if R<O.
The earlier analysis of equation (7) demonstrates the necessity for inclusion of the PB term, and, specifically, how P might be calculated. Presently, this equation serves as an indicator of the relevant factors in a citizen's decision to vote. The equation, however, must be augmented by a specification of these factors' relationships to the candidates' strategies.
We consider two causes of abstention: (1) might have on the citizen's sense of civic duty, D, which appears to be largely the product of long-term socialization (e.g., learning or longterm reinforcement through non-voting). We consider the potential short-term effects on D, nevertheless, and assume that a citizen's probability of voting decreases as the loss he associates with his preferred candidate increases and that his probability of voting increases as this loss decreases.28 Thus, if we say that a citizen's decision to vote is a function of alienation, we mean that in the short run he identifies a preferred candidate, and, if this candidate is not deemed to be satisfactory, the citizen abstains.
Both assumptions-alienation and indifference-have intuitive appeal and it is probable that both operate to some extent in all electorates. We consider each assumption separately, however, to provide ourselves with a tractable mathematical model. We do not consider, though, one potentially important effect on turnout which is represented in (7) by P, the subjective probability of affecting the outcome. We ignore P not because we consider its effects unimportant, but because it would be difficult to include it and because it does not affect many of our results. Generally, we wish to ascertain the dominant spatial positions in a campaign. Our analysis focuses primarily on perfect competition and on equilibrium states; under such conditions P is maximized, identical for all conditions, and can be ignored with some justification.
The list of assumptions which constitute the foundation of our model is now completed. We proceed to the specification of dominant campaign strategies. Note, however, that ascertaining dominant positions or dominant ranges of positions should not be interpreted as presuming that these are in fact the strategies candidates adopt in elections. Candidates obviously have neither the luxury of perfect spatial mobility nor the endowment of perfect information about citizens' preferences. Ascertaining the electorate's preference is one of the difficult objectives for candidates in campaigns. Thus, we assume only that on the average (or in the long run) candidates act in accordance with the model. Deviations from the predictions of our model are expected to occur. We hope, nevertheless, that the model describes and explains some fundamental forces operating in democratic electoral systems and, by a process of Darwinian selection, that these deviations occur around a mean which the model predicts. We turn now to a description of these forces 28 See Hinich and Ordeshook, "Abstentions and Equilibrium . . .," op. cit.
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. 64
when the electorate's preference is best described by a single multivariate density.
IV. ELECTORAL STRATEGIES WITH A SINGLE DENSITY
Since dominant strategies generally do not exist in a multi-dimensional world, one objective of our analysis is to find conditions which yield dominant positions. In other words, our model should be interpreted as an attempt not only to correct the flaw of unidimensionality attributed to Downs, but also to specify conditions sufficient for majority rule. First, we consider two-candidate competition when the electorate's density of preferences is distributed unimodally. Second, the situation when the electorate's density of preferences is unknown is explored. Third, the effect of increasing the dimensionality of the election (i.e., the effect of variations in n, the number of issues) is analyzed. Finally, we consider competition when the electorate's density of preferences is bimodal.
Prior to beginning the analysis, however, we shall assume that the candidate's objective is to maximize his plurality. Although the rewards candidates seek vary (e.g., some candidates might desire idiosyncratic benefits from political activity), it is important to note that winning, at the very least, is instrumental for realizing most such goals. We assume plurality maximization, rather than vote maximization, because if winning is his criterion, a candidate must consider the votes his opponent receives as well as the votes which he receives.29 A candidate must receive a positive plurality to win-not simply "many" votes. Even for those candidates who cannot win because of the historical prejudice of the voters of some districts (e.g., the one-party South), or those who do not seek to win (e.g., candidates who require ideological purity), the standard measure of performance is the disparity between a candidate's votes and the votes which his opponent receives. Thus, in game theoretic terms, we assume that elections are two-person zero-sum games.
It is possible to specify, with this game theoretic assumption, conditions that guarantee the dominance of a single position for any number of dimensions. The most prominent of these conditions is the symmetry and unimodality of 29 For an analysis of electoral strategies when vote maximization is the posited goal see Hinich and Ordeshook, "Plurality Maximization vs. Vote Maximization: A Spatial Analysis with Variable Participation," this REVIEW (forthcoming, September 1970). the electorate's preference density. By unimodality we mean that the preference density, say f(x), has a single mode (e.g., the normal density-function). Symmetry implies that if, for example, the mean of f(x) equals zero, the probability that a randomly selected citizen prefers the position x equals the probability that he prefers the position -x (i.e., f(x) = f(-x)).
Thus, symmetry requires that there exists for every citizen with a given preference, another citizen with a diametrically opposed preference. An example of a symmetric, unimodal density in two dimensions (Figure 9 ) consists of a density whose contour lines are concentric circles or ellipses.
The dominant position for these densities is g, the vector of the means of the preferred points for each dimension. Thus, if f(x) is symmetric and unimodal, a candidate cannot be defeated if he adopts a position equal to the mean of the electorate's preference on each dimension, and this conclusion is valid if all citizens vote or if citizens abstain from voting because of alienation or indifference.
Assuring that conditions exist in a multidimensional contest which guarantee the existence of dominant positions should not obscure the eminent restrictiveness of these conditions. It is unlikely that the electorate's preference is perfectly symmetric, even though the proof of the above theorem assumes perfect symmetry. On the other hand, symmetry and unimodality are merely sufficient conditions, and dominant positions can exist for preference densities which do not have these characteristics. Nevertheless, one should not presume the existence of dominant positions. Thus, as the number of issues increases, the strategic importance of the mean as the focal point of the candidates' strategies increases.
This result demonstrates that varying the number of relevant issues is a potentially valuable campaign strategy. Candidates in strategically advantageous positions should increase the dimensionality of the contest while candidates in disadvantageous positions should simplify the election (i.e., reduce the dimensionality) in addition to shifting to a dominant position. Note also that this result complements the intuitively satisfying notion that if a candidate is in a strategically advantageous position on a number of issues, he should attempt to increase the relative importance of these issues in the campaign.
We conclude that as the number of issues increases, the electoral significance of candidates who advocate extreme positions decreases. Obviously, the number of relevant issues varies from campaign to campaign. The cause of the variation is found, inter alia, in the exigencies of events, the candidates' focus on issues, and an increasingly pluralistic society. Perhaps as the electorate becomes more sophisticated, the number of dimensions required to represent issues increases. The civil rights "issue," for example, is no longer restricted to questions of voting and desegregation. Jobs, housing, business ownership, income distributions, and health, are now also components of this issue. Thus, assuming that responses unrelated to issues do not increase, then as a society grows more complex and the electorate more sophisticated, the chance that an extremist candidate might win is correspondingly diminished. One can also infer that the electoral fortunes of third parties are greatest when the number of issues is small, ceteris paribus. This inference is supported by the observation that, historically, the genesis of minor parties involves a single and dominant issue, and that any subsequent increase in the dimensionality of competition is accompanied either by a decrease in the fortunes of such parties, by their absorption by a major party, or by their replacement of a major party.
It is legitimately argued that individual voters do not perceive, and especially do not have feelings about, the entire spectrum of issues. Instead, voters are characterized as being concerned with a narrow subset of issues with the contents of the subset varying from voter to voter. Thus, farmers are supposed to care about farm price supports and those associated with the petroleum industry are supposed to be concerned with oil import quotas while the rest of us hardly even know about, and certainly are not concerned with, these issues. As the model is stated earlier, it does not include this type of phenomenon. However, with suitable assumptions, it is possible to show that our results concerning the dominanance of the mean are valid for the special case in which each voter is concerned with a single issue, but in which the issue varies from voter to voter. Specifically, if we compute the mean preference for each issue by counting only those who care 441 about that particular issue, and if there is a symmetric preference density, then the mean vector is dominant. Also, if one candidate advocates policies which are "closer" to the vector of means than his opponent's vector, and if everyone votes, then the former candidate wins the election. Thus, our basic results obtain even if voters care only about a single issue which varies from citizen to citizen.
Thus far, however, our discussion considers competition only if f(x) is either unimodal or unknown, though many electoral contests are interesting because the electorate's preference is distributed bimodally. Bimodal distributions indicate the presence of only minimal consensus, and it is competition without consensus which is of most interest for speculating about the selection of public policies by election. It is here, moreover, that we begin to uncover instances when candidates should not converge.
The results of our analysis of bimodal distributions are best expounded if we contrast these results with those achieved when preferences are distributed unimodally. In Table 1 we summarize our results.
Notice that electoral outcomes differ between unimodal and bimodal densities only if alienation causes abstentions. Thus, if all citizens vote or if indifference causes abstentions, the candidates should converge to the mean. One of us discusses this conclusion elsewhere within the context of the responsible parties controversy. Specifically, internal party discipline and an ability to implement programs to which the electorate has given its consent are not sufficient conditions for distinct programs.32 This conclusion is doubtless disconcerting to proponents of a responsible two-party system. Normatively, many of us might feel that whenever preferences are bimodally distributed the two modes of opinion should be represented. Consider, as an example, a situation in which 32Ordeshook, op cit. the society is governed by an omniscient and beneficent dictator faced with the task of selecting the "best" policies for his country, and where citizens' loss functions are marginally increasing (see Figure 6) . The dictator should realize that in any nontrivial situation there is no possibility of satisfying everyone so he must select some scheme for evaluating the relative importance of the society's citizens-some scheme for making interpersonal comparisons of utility. Suppose that the dictator makes the judgment that such comparisons are meaningful, and decides that everyone should be weighed equally. These judgments imply that the best policies are those which minimize the total utility loss of the society. The dictator accomplishes this objective by selecting a position identical to the average desires of the population, so he selects the mean. Hence, competitive conditions which cause the two parties to converge toward the mean result in the electorial process producing the kind of result that a beneficent dictator should choose. This result, of course, although it does tend toward minimal utility losses, is quite contrary to the responsible party doctrine.
The beneficent dictator's preference for the mean is, in fact, more pervasive than the example might suggest. Instead of weighting each citizen identically, assume that the ith voter, with the preference vector xi, is assigned the weight w(x%). Assume also that w(x) is symmetric about the mean of f(x) so that w(x) = w(-x) if the mean is zero. There are two general forms of the weighting function w(x) which are of interest here. First, the beneficient dictator might assign more importance to those in the "middle" than to those who held extreme positions, and in this instance we say that w(x) is unimodal. Second, the dictator might weight "liberals" and "conservatives" more heavily than the "moderators" and in this instance w(x) is termed not unimodal. With these assumptions the dictator's preferences are presented in Table 2 .
Thus, if the citizens' loss functions are marginally increasing the dictator selects the mean for all symmetric f(x) and w(x). Alternatively, if loss functions are both marginally increasing and marginally decreasing no general solution exists (unless f(x) and w(x) are both unimodal). The social welfare "optimality" of the mean, therefore, is sensitive to the form of the citizens' loss functions, as well as the density of citizen preferences. The point here, however, is that in a variety of situations, with a variety of ethical assumptions arbitrarily assigned, the mean appears to be a desirable point. Accordingly, contrary to the responsible parties doctrine,i'forces 442 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. 64 which cause both party platforms to converge toward the mean, rather than recognizing differences in opinion, are not necessarily "bad" and, in the majority of the above cases, are positively "good" if one is willing to accept the assumptions. Returning to Table 1, note that no general solution exists when f(x) is bimodal and alienation causes non-voting. To specify the location of the candidates' preferred positions we must consider two additional aspects of the model. These aspects are (1) restrictions on the candidates' strategies, and (2) the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy. First, if candidates are strategically unrestricted, then even for a single dimension, no dominant position, in general, exists. By imposing restrictions, nevertheless, equilibrium may be restored so that the candidates fail to converge and adopt strategies near the modes of f(x). Specifically, if the candidates are restricted so that they cannot cross each other or cross the median, dominant strategies exist, and they can be different strategies for each candidate. And since both candidates converge to the mean if all citizens vote or if indifference causes abstentions, the only explanation for divergent positions (if candidates are afforded perfect spatial mobility) is that citizens abstain because of alienation.
This situation illustrates one of the values of formal mathematical analysis. Downs offers the intuitively satisfying but mathematically unproved proposition that whenever preferences are distributed bimodally, the forces of abstention prohibit rational candidates from converging. Our analysis demonstrates, however, that this proposition generally is falserestrictions on strategies may be necessary for equilibrium. We can also give meaningful interpretations to these restrictions. First, candidates may be committed ideologically and may be unwilling or unable to adopt platforms abridging such commitments. Second, a party's nomination is commonly a requisite for winning the general election. The candidates, therefore, may find it necessary to make public commitments in conventions or in the primaries which bind them to these policies in the general election. Third, the electorate may associate traditional policies with a candidate and with his party and, therefore, strategies may be beyond the manipulative reach of the candidates except within a limited range. Finally, by crossing either the mean or his opponent's position, a candidate can alienate citizens-political activists, opinion leaders, and interest groups-whose support is vital. In electoral politics, citizens cannot be weighted in proportion to their numerical strength. If the preferences of activists differ from the preferences of the entire electorate, a candidate's optimal strategy should not be calculated from an unweighted aggregate density of preferences.
This last cause of strategy restrictions also offers an explanation of why candidates, who are afforded perfect spatial mobility, might not seek to converge when the mass electorate's preference is unimodally distributed. If the preferences of activists-citizens who are credited with disproportionately greater weightsare bimodally distributed, an electorate in which citizens are weighted in proportion to their potential contribution to a campaign, from a strategic perspective, may be equivalent to an unweighted electorate whose density of preferences is bimodal.33 This idea is consistent with the observation that in competitive districts the legislative acts of Congressmen diverge more frequently from their constituencies' preferences than in less competitive districts. It may be that competition forces Congressmen to assign disproportionate weights to activists, thereby affecting a bimodal distribution (even when the electorate's preference density may be unimodal). Thus, if candidates diverge and if preferences are arrayed unimodally, this should not be interpreted as a refutation of spatial models, but as an indication that the components of competition are far more complex than such simple minded tests.
Earlier we note that a second important consideration in the discussion of bimodal densities is the sensitivity of turnout to varations in strategy. Specifically, if this sensitivity is sufficiently low, the candidates converge to the mean. Thus, we find a second important qualification for Downs's analysis of such distributions of preference. Candidates diverge when preferences are bimodally distributed and when alienation causes abstentions only if the sensitivity of turnout to variations in strategy is sufficiently great. Bimodal distributions and abstentions caused by alienation, then, are not sufficient conditions for non-convergence. "Sufficiently great" is imprecise and most likely it must remain so. The incentives for convergence or divergence are sensitive to so many parameters of f(x) and of turnout that generalization appears impossible. (It is possible, nevertheless, to ascertain dominant positions in specific instances.) We can generalize only by stating that, as the sensitivity of turnout increases, the incentives for non-convergence increase if f(x) is bimodal.
V. ELECTORAL STRATEGIES WITH TWO DENSITIES
Having sketched some theoretical results for competition between two candidates in an electorate which is characterized by a single density of preferences, we now consider electorates characterized by two densities. Specifically, assume that the sum of two symmetric unimodal densities characterizes the electorate's preferences. This permits us to consider the phenomenon of political parties. We cannot analyze, of course, the detailed quality and variety of parties. It is possible to consider in these developments only some salient characteristics. Our approach to party politics assumes that a multivariate, symmetric, uni- the formal proof of this argument is of the limiting variety, the argument need not be stated here in such a form. The inference derived from the theorem is that, ceteris paribus, the greater the discrepancy between A, andA 2, the less a minority party should favor government by simple majority rule.
Among the ceteris paribus conditions, however, are two important parameters of f1(x) and f2(x)-their variances. Considering the usual case in which overlap exists between the two densities, and assuming that the densities are normal or multivariate normal, it is possible to obtain some mathematically rigorous results. Assume that the preferences of the second party are more dispersed (in the sense that its members represent a "wider range" of opinion) than are the preferences of the first party. Two such distributions are represented for the unidimensional case in Figure 12 .
Under these circumstances a necessary condition for the second candidate to win is that it be the majority party. Thus, a "dispersed" minority party, one which encompasses a much wider range of opinion than the majority party, cannot receive a positive plurality. An obvious corollary to this theorem is that minority parties can win elections. Their chances increase, furthermore, as the range of opinion of their membership diminishes, ceteris paribus, relative to the dispersion of the opposition. In the situation depicted in Figure 12 the first party, assumed to be a minority, might win, since the variance of f1(x) around gi is considerably less than the variance of f2(x) around gu2. The discrepancy implies that the first party attracts more votes from the opposition than it loses from defections of its own membership. This point is intuitively satisfying and is useful for interpreting the efforts of minority parties to enforce a singleness of purpose and ideology in countries holding meaningful elections.
The preceding analysis assumes that each candidate adopts the mean vector of his party as his position in the general election. Obviously parties should not seek to constrain their nominees to strategies reflecting solely the preferences of party activists. Otherwise, movement toward the mean of the opposition party, which might increase a candidate's probability of winning, is prohibited. This reasoning suggests an interesting conflict. The minority party has the most to gain by permitting its candidates to diverge from the party's preference, b)ut it must work hard toward retaining its singleness of purpose. The internal tension of minority parties, therefore, is the tempering of ideological purity with the necessity of nominating viable candidates. The majority party, on the other hand has less to gain by permitting its candidates to diverge from the preferences of the party, but it is less concerned with its ideological purity. The internal tension of majority parties, therefore, is the necessity for selecting among an abundance of viable candidates on the basis of some criterion other than ideology.
VI. FROM THEORY TO THE REAL WORLD
Our definition of party structure undoubtedly abstracts many interesting and important distinctions between minority and majority parties, as well as the pervasive conflicts within such organizations. This is, of course, a feature of all theories. Abstractness is not an evil nor can it be avoided in the development of any science. The relevant question is whether we have deduced an empirically valid and meaningful situation or whether we have provided only an insight into the logical equivalences of a mathematical structure which bears little relevance to actual campaigns. Political scientists should not be concerned per se with insights into a mathematical structure. They should be concerned with the relevance of such a structure to exceedingly complex processes. Hence, the correspondences between the real world and our model require identification, and it is these correspondences which should be considered. Arrow's General Impossibility Theorem is an example of the properties of an abstract analysis and its relation to the real world. In section 2 the paradox implied by this theorem is illustrated with a relatively simple situation consisting of three citizens, with unambiguously identified preference orderings over three alternatives, and a predetermined decision rule. One concludes from that illustration that the possibility of intransitive social preference is a pervasive feature of all collective decisionmaking situations. More importantly, Arrow's analysis consists of ascertaining the logical consequences of certain assumptions-assumptions which do not begin to encompass the complexity of social processes. We regard his General Impossibility Theorem as a relevant consideration in all such processes, though, because we believe that he abstracts from these processes certain fundamental characteristics. Our model, like Arrow's, should not be interpreted as a description of the electoral process, but as an abstraction of characteristics which seem fundamental and pervasive in electoral processes.
Despite such conditional statements, some scholars discount a model's value if its assumptions seem naive and unrealistic or if the opportunities for empirical analysis and further development are obscure. These conclusions about a model's assumptions, however, often are the result of two factors which, if recognized, can render the assumptions more palatable. First, there may be an unintentional resistance either to conceptualizing (perhaps diverse) empirical phenomena in terms of a model's parameters or to reinterpreting these parameters. Second, an assumption's suitability may be disputed because of a confusion between the properties of an adequate theory and the properties of a description of reality in terms of the theory.
As an example of the first factor, consider Downs's assumption that competition consists of parties presenting alternative ideological positions to the electorate. Obviously, a party is a complex and heterogeneous organization, and no single point on a scale is an adequate description of its campaign behavior. Thus, Downs abstracts from his analysis a pervasive and important feature of elections. If this assumption seems to be essential for spatial analysis, and if weakening it is a formidable task, we might reject spatial analysis. But if we represent reality as competition between candidates (individuals) and change Downs's label from "party" to "candidate" we increase somewhat the promise of his approach. A party can be interpreted then as a density of individual preferences which constrain the positions candidates adopt in the general elections.35 Hence, a seemingly naive assumption becomes less objectionable by a simple reinterpretation of its content.
As a second example of the first factor, consider our multidimensional model. A common criticism of spatial analysis is that many citizens do not evaluate candidates on the basis of "issues", since voters' preferences are explained by partisan bias or the candidates' images. Some scholars conclude, therefore, that spatial models of competition are wholly inappropriate for understanding elections. Nevertheless, one can argue that partisan identification or candidate "image" can be conceptualized not simply as biases or new parameters but as additional preference dimensions (i.e., elements in each citizen's x vector). Thus, while additional measurement problems require consideration, we can at least reinterpret our data so that no new theoretical variables are required.
As a final example of the first factor, consider the observation that many citizens do more than simply vote in an election-many people contribute time and financial resources to one candidate or to the other. Much of a candidate's energies, moreover, are directed towards such citizens because their support is worth more than an equal number of citizens who contribute only their vote. Thus, spatial models might be construed to be inappropriate for understanding this vital aspect of elections. If we interpret voting as only one kind of political participation, however, and if we assume, by an appropriate redefinition of the terms in equation (7), that R is the utility a citizen derives from participating in some specified manlier, we may interpret our results as the strategies candidates should adopt if they seek to maximize their plurality of any measure of participation. Thus, if we employ the assumption that variations in alternative forms of political participation can be explained by an equivalent calculus we can extend our analysis to the competition for these forms of support.
Reconceptualization also increases opportunities for testing the model. It may be difficult to measure adequately many parameters of a citizen's calculus in mass electorates; factors which we abstract out of the real world (e.g., uncertainty) may confound testability. Our sources of data, though, need not be confined to mass electorates. If we allow the 446 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. 64 generalization concerning participation, for example, we can focus on citizens who might contribute money. And if the model supplies a satisfactory explanation for such people's actions then we have some confidence that the model is useful for discussing other forms of participation. Citizens comprising this restricted data base, furthermore, should have more information concerning the candidates' strategies, and their own preferences. Some of our ideal-type assumptions thereby are renered more consonant with our view of reality.
Nevertheless, reconceptualization cannot account for other phenomena, such as the degree of uncertainty citizens associate with a candidate's strategy. Obviously, citizens associate some uncertainty with each element of Oj, and candidates manipulate the stochastic properties of these elements as a strategic alternative to varying spatial location. Because we explicitly assume that Oj is deterministic, we cannot consider such strategies presently. A fundamental variation in our assumption is necessary, then, if we wish to incorporate uncertainty into the analysis.
Reconceptualization, moreover, cannot diminish the difference in complexity between our theorems about elections and the real elections themselves. What is a candidate's optimal strategy, for example, when he and his opponent seek both votes and finances, when the subset of voter and financial contributors overlap, when the concerns of both subsets overlap, and when the candidates eventually hope to convert dollars into votes? If one assumes that competition occurs between candidates and not parties, as another example, what is the proper role of parties and party structures in a spatial model? Thus, even reconceptualization cannot now include many important elements of elections such as uncertainty, cognitive dissonance, misperception, and the strategies of varying uncertainty and issue saliency. Therefore, one must evaluate the adequacy of spatial models from the perspective of these omissions.
This evaluation entails clarification of a confusion which plagues political research, and which is the second factor accounting for the charge of naivete or unrealism of assumptions. Political scientists commonly confuse the desirable properties of a deductive theory with the properties of an adequate description of reality in terms of such a theory.36 Theory con-'1 For our use of the word theory see Carl G. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966). See also, Otto A. struction consists of formulating general sentences about reality. The general sentences of one or more theories may be applied to particular classes of real world situations. Thus, science proposes no general "theory of falling feathers," for example, which attempts to predict every twist and turn of a feather's flight. One the other hand, one might attempt to fully explain and predict a feather's path if the environmental conditions are well specified, and if sufficient computer resources are available; and such an effort would undoubtedly utilize existing theory. Nevertheless, the fact that parsimonious propositions about falling feathers cannot be constructed is not interpreted as an inadequacy of Newtonian physics.
For identical reasons, political scientists should not expect theories from which we deduce directly all relevant or interesting aspects of reality. Instead we must differentiate between the process of constructing theories and that of applying them. This distinction necessarily entails differentiating between those facets of reality which we do not conceptualize as elements of our theory and those elements which are simple complex combinations of laws we understand theoretically.
Consider, for example, our assumption that all citizens weight the issues in an identical fashion (or our weaker assumption that these weights are distributed independently of preference). Obviously, this assumption is not satisfied generally. Hence, the critic might reject our analysis or demand that such an assumption be removed. If we remove it, however, no general sentences may be forthcoming -the situation appears to be entirely too unstructured for the construction of law-like generalizations, although our perception may or may not be correct. We can suggest, however, a strategy for empirical research about the positions which candidates are likely to adopt: (1) decompose the electorate into subgroups such that for each subgroup one reasonably might anticipate compliance with the independence assumption (e.g., Pool et al's categories) ;37 (2) assuming that, for each subgroup, preferences are distributed symmetrically and unimodally, ascertain the mean 
